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Abstract 
Chenyang Li’s new book, The Philosophy of Confucian Harmony, has been heralded as the 
first book-length exposition of the concept of harmony in the approximately 3,000 year old 
Confucian tradition. It provides a systematic analysis of Confucian harmony and defence of 
its relevance for contemporary moral and political thought. In this philosophical discussion of 
Li’s book, I expound its central claims, contextualize them relative to other salient work in 
English-speaking Confucian thought, and critically reflect on them, particularly in light of a 
conception of harmony that is salient in the sub-Saharan African tradition. Hence, this article 
aims to continue the nascent dialogue between indigenous Chinese and African philosophical 
traditions that has only just begun. 
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Introduction 
According to Daniel A. Bell’s dust-jacket endorsement, Chenyang Li’s The Philosophy of 
Confucian Harmony (2014) is the first book-length manuscript on the topic ever produced in 
the approximately 3,000 year old Confucian tradition. Although I am not qualified to judge 
the accuracy of this bold claim, it is clear to me that Li’s book is a unique and important 
addition to Confucian philosophy composed in English. In this critical notice, I expound its 
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central claims, contextualize them relative to other work in Anglophone Confucian 
philosophy, and raise some questions about and objections to them. 
 While there have been several reviews and discussions of Li’s book (including Lu 
2014; Tang 2014; Bell 2015a; Pokorny 2015; Rosker 2015; Tan 2015), none has considered it 
in light of the sub-Saharan philosophical tradition. It is literally only in the past five years that 
philosophers working in the indigenous Chinese and African traditions have begun comparing 
and contrasting values (Bell and Metz 2011; Unah 2014; Metz 2014, 2015a, 20171). One thing 
that they have revealed is that harmony is a concept central to both Confucianism and the sub-
Saharan ethic of ubuntu, the famous southern African (specifically, Nguni) word for human 
excellence. It should be revealing, therefore, to consider Li’s conception of Confucian 
harmony from the standpoint of a characteristically African conception of it. Although I note 
some similarities between the two, my primary aim is to highlight key differences, ones that 
have important implications for how individuals should live and institutions should be 
organized. 
 In the next section, I expound the key elements of The Philosophy of Confucian 
Harmony and compare it to other recent books in English-speaking Confucian philosophy, 
bringing out what contributions it has made to the philosophical literature (section 2). In the 
next three sections, I critically explore Li’s analysis of harmony in light of three other 
concepts central to Confucianism, namely, self-realization (section 3), ren, or human 
excellence through beneficence (section 4) and hierarchy (section 5). For each concept, I 
reflect on not only how harmony as conceived in the Confucian tradition bears on it, but also 
what one salient sub-Saharan conception of harmony entails for the issues raised.  
                                                 
1 Social scientists have also just begun to compare values in the two regions, e.g., Hofstede et 
al. (2010); Anedo (2012); Matondo (2012); Ampiah (2014). 
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Although I note respects in which those coming from an African perspective would 
question the merits of Confucian harmony as Li authoritatively interprets it, my aim is not to 
show that the doubts are indeed sound, let alone to reject Li’s philosophy. Instead, I seek to 
put it into conversation with a philosophical tradition that turns out to be much closer to it 
than characteristic Anglo-American and Continental ones. I conclude by indicating some of 
the key issues that merit further reflection as the exchanges continue between thinkers guided 
by indigenous Chinese and African values (section 6).  
Li’s Methods, Aims, and Claims 
The Confucian Philosophy of Harmony is, as per its title, a work of philosophy, and, more 
specifically, value theory or ethics. Social scientists would usually think about values (or 
norms) descriptively, in terms of what people report about their beliefs or what one can infer 
about people’s beliefs from their behaviour (e.g., Hofstede and Bond 1988: 8-9). In contrast, 
most ethicists and moral philosophers approach values prescriptively and analytically.2 By the 
former I mean that they seek to argue for the values that people ought to hold or prioritize, if 
they do not already. By the latter I mean that they reflect carefully on the content of values, 
not only clarifying their nature, perhaps by providing a careful definition of them, but also 
considering their logical and explanatory relationships, say, determining which values are 
fundamental and which are derivative. Li’s book is philosophical in both of these senses, as 
will be my own critical discussion of it below.  
One of Li’s three major aims is to present and defend a certain view of which value is 
central to the Confucian philosophical tradition and how it relates to other values in it. 
According to Li, harmony is the final value that is most central to the Confucianism, with 
(nearly) all other major values being a function of it.  
                                                 
2 Some also do so phenomenologically, in terms of what it is subjectively like to abide by the 
values, exemplified most influentially these days by the work of Emmanuel Levinas. 
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As he Li notes (2014: 18), ren, i.e., human excellence through beneficence (care, 
compassion and related dispositions), has often been taken to be the most “central” or basic 
moral category in Confucian thought. Li makes an extremely strong case for thinking it is not. 
He draws a distinction between the thought of Confucius himself, on the one hand, and 
Confucian thought more generally, on the other. Li grants that ren might be basic to 
Confucius’ thinking, but contends that it is too narrow to capture the broader tradition. Li 
maintains in particular that this broader tradition includes values that ren cannot capture, but 
that harmony can while also capturing what ren does. I discuss these matters below in some 
detail; for now, note that Li points out that ren is an interpersonal ideal (addressed in terms of 
harmony in chs. 7-9), but that the Confucian tradition also includes intrapersonal factors (ch. 
6) as well as more cosmic considerations (ch. 10) that are not well captured by beneficence. 
A second major aim of Li’s book is also analytic for seeking to clarify the nature of 
harmony in the face of misinterpretations and to distinguish it from related ideas. Li often 
speaks to the Western reader, urging her to consider how the word “harmony” as it has often 
been used by philosophers and thinkers from that background differs greatly from the 
Confucian sense of it.  
Confucian harmony is neither mere peace, nor sameness, nor agreement, nor 
conformity to a fixed order. Although Confucian harmony often includes peace, it is not 
reducible to it and includes more integration than mere détente. It is also by definition not 
sameness, as it necessarily includes differential elements. It is not simply agreement, for those 
who have different opinions and perspectives can harmonize, and, indeed, if they had 
identical views, then there would be mere sameness. Finally, it is not merely aligning oneself 
to a predetermined cosmic pattern, for harmony is often something to be established between 
people and even within a given one of them.  
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According to Li, Confucian harmony is, in contrast, essentially a matter of different 
elements coming together, where differences are not merely respected, but also integrated in 
such a way that the best of them is brought out and something new is created. “Harmony is an 
active process in which heterogeneous elements are brought into a mutually balancing, 
cooperatively enhancing, and often commonly benefiting relationship” (Li 2014: 1; for 
additional definitional statements, see 9, 47-48, 109-110, 113, 126). Li often appeals to 
aesthetic analogies to illustrate this concept of “creative tension” between disparate 
properties, his favoured catchphrase for harmony; think of different instruments making 
music together, or a variety of ingredients that form a tasty soup.3 
In the first instance, harmony so conceived is a property that is to be realized between 
people, roughly such that differences between them ought to be combined in a way that is 
good for all. “Confucian interpersonal harmony begins with family….The cultivated person’s 
loving relationships with his wife and children are like a symphony where different 
instruments are played in concert” (Li 2014: 82). However, the concept also applies beyond 
the interpersonal, so that, for instance, an individual person’s emotions, feelings and beliefs 
ought to cohere together. 
                                                 
3 The concept in the Western tradition most like Confucian harmony, as Li interprets it, is that 
of organic unity; both are a matter of a whole composed of diverse elements that is greater 
than the sum of its parts. It would be fascinating to consider elsewhere how Confucian 
harmony and organic unity differ. One line to pursue is that the former is characteristically 
hierarchical, as discussed below, whereas the latter is not. Another angle is that the former is 
often supposed to be good for all the members of the harmonious relationship, whereas in the 
latter case the emphasis is often on the value of the whole as distinct from that of the parts. 
On organic unity in Western philosophy, see Moore (1903); Nozick (1981: 403-450); and 
Sedgwick (2012: 45-69). See also Li (2014: 17) for mention of “organic whole”. 
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In addition to contrasting this, Confucian conception of harmony from Western 
notions, Li also works to differentiate it from other Chinese interpretations of the concept. In 
particular, he indicates how it is distinct from the talk of “harmony” found in two other major 
Chinese moral-philosophical traditions, namely, Daoism, which roughly prescribes fitting into 
a natural order, and Mohism, which demands universal beneficence (for concise overviews of 
both, see Wong 2013).  
Li’s third major aim in the book is prescriptive, a matter of arguing that the Confucian 
conception of harmony is (the) one that should inform contemporary moral thought and 
practice. Separate chapters contend that harmony is a plausible ideal when thinking about 
how: one should become a good person (ch. 6); family members ought to interact (ch. 7); a 
government ought to engage with its citizens (ch. 8); and states ought to relate to one another 
(ch. 9). Before discussing several of these views in some detail in the contexts of self-
realization, ren and hierarchy, I highlight what Li has accomplished in The Confucian 
Philosophy of Harmony, compared to other sole-authored books in English focusing on 
Confucian normative philosophy.  
Li is not the first to have conceived of Confucian harmony as, roughly, symbiotic 
interaction between different elements, and to have contended that it is central to 
Confucianism (e.g., Yao 2000: 170-173; cf. Ihara 2004). However, he has done so in by far 
the most systematic and, to my mind, conclusive fashion.   
Furthermore, most of the recent Anglophone books on Confucianism have sought to 
advance a political philosophy about, say, how to distribute state power or what the proper 
aims of a state should be (Tan 2003; Bell 2006, 2015b; Angle 2012; Bai 2012; Cline 2013; 
Chan 2014; Elstein 2015). In contrast, Li’s book addresses the nature of harmony much more 
thoroughly than these texts, and applies it to a much wider array of topics, including how to 
develop virtue and how to relate in a family. 
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Finally, there are those who have addressed Confucian morality at the intrapersonal 
and interpersonal levels (and not strictly the political). However, they have either focused on 
expounding the views of particular Confucian thinkers (e.g., Ivanhoe 2000), or have deemed 
different concepts to be central to Confucianism, such as family (Fan 2010) or role (Ames 
2011). Li would maintain, plausibly in my view, that harmony is more basic than these other 
concepts, which are derivative. Regardless of whether that is true, a clear virtue of Li’s book 
is that it occasions such a foundational debate amongst Confucian value theorists.  
In sum, then, Li’s book is unique for having articulated the concept of harmony in the 
most depth, argued with plausibility that it is foundational to Confucianism, and applied it to a 
wide array of normative topics. Its thoroughness and comprehensiveness in these respects are 
welcome additions to the field.  
Self-Realization and Harmony 
In the rest of this article, I consider how harmony, as Li understands it, plausibly relates to 
other values often deemed to be inherent to Confucianism, as well as how a characteristically 
sub-Saharan approach to harmony is similar and different. I aim to highlight respects in which 
the Confucian and African interpretations of harmony clash and so provide divergent 
prescriptions for contemporary behaviour and policy.  
 One concept that is cardinal for Confucianism is self-realization or self-cultivation. 
Often for those in this tradition, the ultimate reason for one to perform a given action is to 
realize one’s true self. The thought is that there is a higher, distinctly human part of one’s 
nature, which contrasts with a lower, animal part, and that the point of living is to develop the 
former and to overcome the latter. The idea is reminiscent of ancient Greek eudaimonism (and 
is salient in African philosophical thought, as I discuss below). 
Li points this out in the book, quoting Mencius, second only to Confucius himself 
when it comes to influencing the Confucian tradition: “‘If I….do not live through human 
 8 
excellence and moral rightness, it is called self-abandonment’ (Mencius 4A10; TTC 2721). 
Mencius holds that humans by nature….tend towards goodness; if a person tends to the 
contrary, he is giving up his real self” (Li 2014: 92). 
The question that arises is how self-realization and harmony are supposed to relate to 
one another. On the one hand, Li has maintained that harmony is foundational to Confucian 
moral and political thought, while, on the other, he seems to acknowledge that self-realization 
is.  
Although I believe that Li’s ultimate view is that self-realization just is to live 
harmoniously, that they are ultimately one and the same thing, it takes a bit of work to 
apprehend that from the book. There are instead passages suggesting that self-realization and 
harmony are distinct properties, with one serving as a (mere) cause of the other.  
For example, sometimes Li appears to maintain that self-cultivation is a mere means 
towards the production of harmony. “Once a person’s will becomes cheng, his heart-mind can 
be set upright. Once his heart-mind is set upright, he can cultivate his self. Once his self is 
cultivated, he can harmonize the family….Once he harmonizes the family, he can put the 
country in good order” (a quotation from The Great Learning in Li 2014: 89). “Through 
dedication, a person sets his heart-mind right and engages himself diligently in cultivation, 
and he thereby achieves the goal of becoming a cultivated person and is able to harmonize not 
only with himself but also with other people” (Li 2014: 98). 
These quotes suggest that one should value self-cultivation (solely) as a tool to 
generate harmony. However, that is not Li’s considered view, as it would not give adequate 
recognition to the importance of self-realization as a final value, i.e., as something valuable 
for its own sake, and not a solely instrumental one (Li 2014: 89, 101).  
Other passages are naturally read as maintaining the opposite view, that harmony is 
(solely) a tool to generate self-cultivation. For instance, one finds these lines: “When harmony 
 9 
is achieved and maintained, individuals in it thrive….(For) Mencius….people’s harmony is 
the most important of the three concepts that influence the success of human affairs. To 
achieve a major goal, a leader must….have ensured that his people are working together 
harmoniously” (Li 2014: 15). “(T)here is no (real) peace without harmony, and there is no 
happiness without peace” (Liu 2014: 124). “In this view….(h)armony is necessary to human 
happiness….(W)ithout harmony….nothing in the world would be able to flourish…Harmony 
in persons results in virtuous persons” (Li 2014: 15, 16, 17, 20). 
These quotations suggest that harmony is a mere means towards other goods, such as 
thriving, success, happiness, flourishing and virtue. However, that, too, is not Li’s view, as it 
would not give adequate recognition to the importance of harmony as a final value (Li 2014: 
1, 9, 10, 68, 70, 168). 
I think the best way to read Li is as suggesting that, although self-realization can cause 
harmony and harmony can cause self-realization, they also constitute one another, with such 
being the typical relation between them. On this score, one finds these passages: “The ideal 
good individual attains harmony within his or her person and also with other individuals….A 
person who is guided by ritual propriety is a good person….(and a) person of ritual propriety 
is one who can harmonize with himself and with others” (Li 2014: 18, 70). 
These remarks suggest that one’s true nature is to harmonize, so that one becomes a 
genuine human being insofar as one lives harmoniously. Such a view is a plausible way to 
construe the relationship between two properties that each have a strong claim to being 
foundational in Confucianism.  
And it is fascinating that it is so similar to typical sub-Saharan understandings of 
ethics. Before addressing them, note that when I speak of “sub-Saharan” or “African” values, 
I am of course making generalizations, specifically, claims about features that have been 
salient amongst many (not essential to all) indigenous peoples, or at least the philosophers 
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inspired by them, below the Sahara desert for a long span of time. I am contending that 
certain philosophical views have been recurrent (not universal, not exclusive) there.4  
Working with a bird’s-eye view of ethical thought in a large region is natural for 
philosophers, who seek out what is abstract and general. Those with a more social scientific 
background might prefer a discussion with more context and particularity, say, a study of the 
beliefs of a specific African people such as the Igbo in Nigeria or the Akan in Ghana as they 
bear on Confucianism (undertaken in Anedo 2012 and Ampiah 2014, respectively). While 
there are at least several hundred linguistic and ethnic groups in sub-Saharan Africa, which of 
course have different cultures and worldviews, those who have learned about many of them 
agree that there are broad commonalities amongst them (for just a handful of examples, see 
Gyekye 1996; Ramose 1999; Bujo 2005; Metz 2007; Wiredu 2008; Nkulu-N’Sengha 2009). I 
therefore submit that both approaches are warranted and should be informed by one another; 
it would be ideal for scholars to think about the particular and to do so in light of the general, 
and vice versa. In this article, I focus strictly on the general, citing thinkers from a variety of 
peoples in sub-Saharan Africa to substantiate claims about what is salient amongst them, or at 
least their philosophers. 
As is well known to scholars of indigenous Africa, maxims often used to sum up 
morality include “A person is a person through other persons” (e.g., Mokgoro 1998: 17; 
Dandala 2009: 260; Nkulu-N’Sengha 2009) and “I am because we are” (e.g., Menkiti 1984: 
171; Mbiti 1990: 106, 110, 113). Although these phrases have metaphysical or descriptive 
senses, to the effect that one is dependent on others for one’s existence and identity, they also 
have moral or prescriptive senses. Personhood, selfhood and humanness in characteristic 
traditional sub-Saharan language and thought are value-laden concepts; that is, one can be 
                                                 
4 For further analysis of the meaning of geographical terms such as “African”, “Western” and 
the like, see Metz (2015b). 
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more or less of a person, self or human being, where the more one is, the better (for 
discussion in the context of several traditional African peoples, see Nkulu-N’Sengha 2009). 
One’s ultimate goal in life should be to become a complete person, a real self or a genuine 
human being, one who has ubuntu. 
In addition, for one large swathe of African moral thought, the central way to realize 
oneself is by living harmoniously, or communally, with others. Consider the following 
remarks from Desmond Tutu about sub-Saharan peoples’ views of morality:  
We say, “a person is a person through other people.” It is not “I think therefore I am.” 
It says rather: “I am human because I belong.” I participate, I share….Harmony, 
friendliness, community are great goods. Social harmony is for us the summum 
bonum—the greatest good. Anything that subverts or undermines this sought-after 
good is to be avoided like the plague (1999: 35). 
Although below in the rest of this article I bring out respects in which a characteristically 
African conception of harmony differs from the Confucian, the present point is that, for both 
traditions, there are distinctively human and more animalistic sides of one’s nature, one’s 
basic aim in life should be to realize one’s higher, human nature, and the way to do that is to 
relate to others in a certain, harmonious way (as I first noted in Metz 2015a).5 In this respect, 
these two non-Western traditions turn out to have much more in common with one another 
than either does with typically modern Western approaches to ethics, where individualist 
concepts of freedom, autonomy, agreement, contract, pleasure and happiness are more 
                                                 
5 For many thinkers, such as Tutu (1999), one’s self-realization is constituted by living 
harmoniously, whereas for others, the latter is an essential means to another value considered 
basic, such as the promotion of vital force (Bujo 1997) or the common good (Gyekye 1997).  
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commonly deemed to be foundational.6  
Of course, not all Western values are individualist in these ways, with there being a 
communitarian tradition. However, the latter is far from dominant in Euro-American thought, 
and it tends towards either the relativist view that norms are binding because accepted by a 
group (e.g., Sandel 1984) or the corporatist view that groups have a moral significance 
beyond their individual members (often ascribed to Hegel, as discussed in Masolo 2004). 
Indigenous African and Chinese values, in contrast, focus on ideals of communing with other 
individuals or interacting with them harmoniously. I suggest they are aptly characterized as 
“relational” values, in contrast to individualist, relativist or holist ones (on which see 
Christians 2004: 244-245; Metz 2012b; Metz and Miller 2016). 
Ren and Harmony 
As Li notes, ren, i.e., human excellence through beneficence (care, compassion), has often 
been taken to be the most central or basic moral category in Confucian thought (2014: 18). 
Recall that Li argues that ren is not sufficiently comprehensive to make sense of self-
cultivation and interaction with nature and the universe, whereas harmony is. The question 
remains as to how harmony and ren interrelate, given that they are not one and the same 
thing.  
 I find Li’s answers to this question to be vague. He maintains that ren and harmony 
“complement one another” (2014: 20) and that they are both “central concepts” (2014: 19) of 
Confucianism. These phrases could usefully be more precise, and on the face of it admit of 
weak readings to the effect that ren and harmony exist “side by side”, but have no overlap or 
other connection.  
                                                 
6 Aristotle, and the early Marx as inspired by him, are close, but, even here, there are large 
differences, on which see Metz (2012a). 
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These characterizations should be stronger, not only for the Confucian tradition, but 
also, I strongly suspect, for Li’s own reading of it. There is plausibly a more robust, partially 
constitutive relationship between ren and harmony. In particular, I gather Li would, upon 
reflection, maintain that a large part of what it is to live harmoniously is to live beneficently. 
Since Confucian “harmony” for Li characteristically includes the idea of tension taking a 
form in which there is “a favorable environment for each party to flourish” (Li 2014: 9), and 
since ren, beneficence, is action done with the expectation that it will improve another party’s 
flourishing, it makes good sense to say that ren partially constitutes harmonious living. The 
two properties are not co-extensive, however, since ren is naturally construed as 
interpersonal, whereas, again, harmony can be intrapersonal or even obtain between persons 
and non-persons, by Li’s reading of Confucianism. 
An interesting question that arises at this point is about the precise nature of living 
harmoniously through ren. Clearly, a harmonious agent is one disposed to help others. 
However, neither what counts as “help”, nor when an individual can reasonably expect it, are 
obvious, and Li’s book occasions awareness of different understandings of these issues. 
First, there are times when Li seems to maintain that living harmoniously implies that 
others around one actually flourish. That is, there are passages where Li suggests that 
harmony with others implies they are in fact living well. “When harmony is achieved and 
maintained, individuals in it thrive” (2014: 15; see also 12).  
However, second, at other times Li says that harmony “creates constructive conditions 
for the healthy existence of all parties” (2014: 10) or means that one is to “let each thrive in 
his or her own way” (2014: 122), which statements do not imply that health or thriving has 
actually been achieved (see also 2014: 1).  
And then there are, third, still other points where Li maintains that a concern for 
harmony can mean that others are intentionally harmed upon being sacrificed for a greater 
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good. “Confucian harmony is a holistic rather than an individualistic philosophy….This kind 
of philosophy carries an inherent risk of sacrificing individuals and smaller units for the sake 
of the larger and the whole” (2014: 14). This sort of approach to harmony does not cohere 
well with the first approach above, according to which it implies that the “individuals in it 
thrive”. 
I submit that something like the second approach is the most promising, in light of 
ethical judgments salient in not merely the Confucian moral tradition, but the bodies of 
thought most attractive to just about any contemporary audience of professional ethicists and 
moral philosophers.  
Consider that it is too demanding to suppose that harmony or ren must result in actual 
benefit to people. There would intuitively be no lack of human excellence through 
beneficence if unforeseeable, accidental or insurmountable conditions prevented a person 
from actually benefiting as a result of a well-intentioned agent taking a means reasonably 
expected to help him. For example, if someone were drowning in the ocean, and one dove in 
to save him, one would have acted out of ren or harmony, even if one failed to rescue the 
person. What matters most for Confucianism, or any relational ethic, is that people relate 
beneficently, not a state of affairs in which others benefit (especially where that could have 
resulted unintentionally or even contrary to the agent’s intentions). 
If living harmoniously with other persons need not mean that their lives in fact go 
better as a result of one’s engagement with them, can it also mean that one makes their lives 
go worse for the sake of others or a “greater harmony”? Li is lead to suspect so by virtue of 
reflections on harmony in the natural world, specifically between populations of wolves and 
sheep (2014: 13-14).  
It is reasonable to think that there is such as thing as harmony within and between 
groups. However, when constructing an attractive ethic for persons, group harmony should 
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take second place to relating harmoniously with individuals; the corporate should not override 
the relation. Even if one could maximize the amount of harmony in a society in the long run 
by killing one innocent person with the purpose of redistributing his organs to four people 
who would die without them, one would be wrong to do it.  
So, I do not think that the basic obligation of a Confucian moral agent is, as Li often 
says (esp. ch. 8), to promote harmonious relationships throughout society; for in order to 
maximize harmony globally, one might need to be discordant locally, and in ways that are 
intuitively immoral, as per the organs case above. A more promising construal of a Confucian 
moral agent’s basic obligation, at least when it comes to people, is to relate to each individual 
harmoniously or at least in a way that respects harmony (which would allow for some discord 
in response to those who will not stop being discordant; cf. Li 2014: 13, 145, 169).7 Although 
one should seek to foster harmony in society, especially if one is in a position of influence 
such as a politician, it must not come at the expense of relating harmoniously to individuals.  
Suppose, then, that when it comes to beneficence towards persons, a Confucian 
roughly ought to relate to individuals harmoniously or to honour harmonious relationships 
with them, where that means doing what is likely to make other people better off, but that 
need not result in them actually benefiting. How does that conception of (interpersonal) 
harmony compare with a characteristically African conception of it? 
I detect three major differences between them, two of which I discuss in the rest of 
this section and one I save for the next. In the following section I note that harmony for 
indigenous sub-Saharan thought has often meant sharing power, and I weigh this perspective 
                                                 
7 In some places, Li maintains that to relate harmoniously to others is to give each one due 
consideration (2014: 17, 122-123, 126). Given that it does not suggest a utilitarian calculus 
according to which the interests of each are merely to be summed up and maximized, this 
kind of approach would also be a promising way to avoid corporatism. 
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up against Confucian political meritocracy. Here, I discuss the fact that African harmony 
often includes sharing a sense of self and also sharing resources with strangers, themes that 
are not as visible in Confucianism.  
First, when thinkers from a variety of sub-Saharan peoples and places have thought 
about what it is to harmonize or to commune with other people, they have often referred not 
just to a kind of beneficence that Confucians would appreciate, but also to sharing a sense of 
self or identifying with one another. Consider the following statements:  
The Nigerian philosopher Segun Gbadegesin says that for traditional Yoruba morality, 
“Every member is expected to consider him/herself an integral part of the whole and to play 
an appropriate role towards achieving the good of all” (1991: 65). 
Probably the most influential African political philosopher since the post-
independence era, the Ghanaian Kwame Gyekye, says, “A harmonious cooperative social life 
requires that individuals demonstrate sensitivity to the needs and interests of 
others....Communitarian moral theory....advocates a life lived in harmony and cooperation 
with others, a life of mutual consideration and aid and of interdependence, a life in which one 
shares in the fate of the other” (1997: 72, 76). 
Former South African Constitutional Court Justice Yvonne Mokgoro remarks of a 
sub-Saharan ethic, “Harmony is achieved through close and sympathetic social relations 
within the group” (1998: 17), and Simunye, which means “We are one” in Zulu, is a 
frequently encountered maxim in South Africa.  
Finally, the Kenyan historian of African philosophy Dismas Masolo highlights what 
he calls the “communitarian values” of “living a life of mutual concern for the welfare of 
others, such as in a cooperative creation and distribution of wealth….Feeling integrated with 
as well as willing to integrate others into a web of relations free of friction and conflict” 
(2010: 240). 
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In these and other statements, there is mention of two distinct values (first analyzed in 
Metz 2007). On the one hand there is reference to beneficence in the form of achieving the 
good of all, mutual consideration and aid, sympathy, and concern for the welfare of others. 
However, there is, on the other hand, reference to considering oneself a part of the whole, 
being interdependent and sharing a fate, being close, and feeling integrated. The latter 
concepts go beyond beneficence, and are well summarized as sharing a sense of self or 
enjoying a feeling of togetherness. 
 Confucian families might well experience such emotions, but the point is that 
Confucian philosophy does not appear to place moral value on them, at least not to the degree 
that African philosophy does. Harmony in the sub-Saharan tradition is often construed as 
including ideals such as thinking of oneself as a “we” and not so much an “I”, taking pride in 
what one’s “we” has accomplished (or, conversely, shame in its failures), and liking the fact 
that one is part of a “we”. 
 As Chinese and African philosophers continue to exchange ideas, it would be 
interesting for them to consider whether either has the “better” conception of harmony in this 
respect. Both views are naturally understood as grounding ethics on the ways that family 
members intuitively should interact (e.g., Shutte 2001: 28-29; Fan 2010). Pressing questions 
from Africans to the Chinese would be: is not one thing you value about a family a sense of 
togetherness, and is that not something to seek to recreate elsewhere, as is feasible?  
There is some evidence that Chinese people, or at least those heavily influenced by 
Confucianism, do not typically prize positive other-regarding emotions in a family setting, 
with recent discussion about the relative infrequency of the phrase “I love you” being a case 
in point (e.g., Chung 2014; Lake 2014).8 Is this a case where positive emotions are valued, but 
not expressed? Or not expressed with language, but expressed via actions? Or is it rather a 
                                                 
8 Cf. the values survey conducted by The Chinese Cultural Connection (1987). 
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case where positive emotions are not valued? If so, is there any neutral angle from which to 
reasonably say that they should be valued, or, conversely, that they should not be, when it 
comes to morality? There is fascinating work on this score to be done by cross-cultural 
psychologists and philosophers. 
A second recurrent theme amongst African discussions of harmony and morality in 
general is hospitality, the practice of being extremely welcoming towards strangers (e.g., 
Mandela 2006; Gathogo 2008; Mnyaka and Motlhabi 2009: 77; Matondo 2012: 41). 
Beneficence is to be exhibited not merely with family members or even one’s in-groups (cf. 
guanxi), but also with other human beings one does not know. As is often noted, it has been 
common for traditional African villages to invite strangers to stay with them and to share 
space and food that would have normally gone to family, at least for a short time. Bell claims 
that neither such a practice nor the principle has been recurrent in the Confucian tradition 
(Bell and Metz 2011: 89-90). 
Here, again, cross-cultural debate would be revealing. Both the Confucian and African 
traditions of moral thought are clearly partial, meaning that they give some priority to those 
with whom is already in relationship (on which see Appiah 1998). Traditionally, blood ties 
and clan were the basis of the relevant relationship, but these days Confucian and African 
philosophers focus on harmonious relationships. Those with whom one has already 
harmonized are entitled to more harmonization than those with whom one has not.  
However, the concept of human dignity has also been salient in the African tradition. 
Indigenous sub-Saharans typically believe that all human beings, by virtue of having a life 
that has come from God, have an inviolable worth that demands respect, which means that 
one has some reason to relate harmoniously with anyone (who at least is also willing to 
harmonize). In contrast, dignity, at least of a sort thought to ground cosmopolitan hospitality 
or universal human rights, is not a central feature of Confucian moral thought (e.g., Ihara 
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2004; Donnelly 2009: 67-73). What Confucians instead often acknowledge is the idea that 
each human being is entitled to some kind of moral treatment in virtue of her special capacity 
for virtue (e.g., Li 2014: 160-161). 
Again, those from an African standpoint would be inclined to press: if everyone has a 
moral status (even if not a dignity) because they are capable of virtue or human excellence, 
then should not one be hospitable to and welcoming of strangers? Can it not be appropriate 
sometimes to forsake the interests, at least trivial or moderate ones, of family for the sake of 
non-family? According to the Confucian tradition, “The family was not seen as a necessary 
condition for the good life, it was the good life” (so reports Bell 2006: 145). Are there deep 
grounds within Confucianism to temper this claim, to the extent it is true? If not, is there 
something for it to learn from another tradition? Or, conversely, is it worth “biting the bullet” 
as Ruiping Fan seems to do?: “(F)avoritism to family members does not ipso facto appear as 
corrupt until proven otherwise. Instead, when set within a life of Confucian virtue, familial 
favoritism is itself virtuous” (2010: xii). 
Hierarchy and Harmony 
The previous section considered the respect in which Confucian harmony is partially 
constituted by beneficence (ren), what the nature of beneficence qua interpersonal harmony 
is, and how it compares to an African conception of interpersonal harmony, which extends 
beneficence to strangers, even at the expense of family to some degree, and also includes a 
sense of togetherness, a moral dimension beyond beneficence altogether. In this section I 
discuss the relationship between harmony, as Li understands it, and hierarchy in the 
Confucian tradition, and then view these matters from a common African understanding of 
harmony.  
 One striking feature of Li’s central characterization of harmony is that it is not 
essentially hierarchal. It can include inegalitarian relationships, but it does not require them 
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for harmony to obtain. As I have noted, a typical definition of “harmony” for Li is: “an active 
process in which heterogeneous elements are brought into a mutually balancing, cooperatively 
enhancing, and often commonly benefiting relationship” (2014: 1; see also 9, 47-48, 109-110, 
113, 126). There is nothing necessarily unequal about a mutually beneficial, or at least a 
productive, unity amongst diverse elements. 
 Li’s conception of harmony constitutes something of a departure from traditional 
Confucianism, which is more inegalitarian and role-oriented (on which see Li 2014: 69, 102-
103, 108-109). Consider the “Three Bonds”, the human relationships in which, and by which, 
one is particularly expected to realize harmony. “Minister serving ruler, son serving father, 
wife serving husband, if these three relationships run in harmony, All-under-Heaven will have 
order” (quoted by Dau-Lin 1970/1971: 29-30; see also Tu 1998; Q Wang 2011). It is 
commonly thought that the “cardinal spirit of Confucianism is that everyone should play 
one’s essential role and function” (T Wang 2011: 98), with the Three Bonds being central and 
with other relationships to be modelled on them. Essential to the Three Bonds is the idea of 
higher and lower positions, with the populace, the young and the female occupying the latter, 
as they are thought to lack the requisite qualifications (of virtue, education, wisdom) to rule. 
 As is well known, hierarchical power in the Confucian tradition is not to be 
understood as domineering and arbitrary. Parents and rulers are expected to do what is good 
for children and citizens (respectively), and especially to promote their virtue (Li 2014: 69, 
199-120, 123, 130). In addition, children may remonstrate with parents, as may citizens with 
rulers (2014: 105-106, 168).  
Even so, the standard relationship is one of a superior who acts in the interests of an 
inferior who is respectful, if not deferential. In other words, traditionally speaking, action 
according to roles with differential power is one salient aspect of harmonization, viz., 
interaction between different elements in a way that brings out the best of them all.  
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Li is keen to temper the inegalitarian conception of harmony, when it comes to gender. 
He maintains that Confucian harmony, as he interprets it, in a family does not require the man 
to have power over the wife. He also contends that the man and the woman need not have 
fixed tasks to perform based on their gender, with the woman staying home to look after the 
house and children. Instead, harmony would obtain in a family if the man and the woman 
undertook different tasks that were freely chosen (2014: 69-70, 101-116; cf. T Wang 2011).  
 It is not clear to me whether Li can consistently advocate egalitarianism in the family 
but resist it in the political realm. Although he does not discuss political meritocracy in the 
book, in another recent work Li abides by the traditional interpretation of Confucianism and 
appears to favour it over democracy (Bell and Li 2013). If there should be political rulers 
appointed by qualifications, viz., virtue and education, the same would appear to be true for 
the family. Since qualifications do not track gender, Li indeed has firm grounds for not 
always assigning the head of the household to the man. However, by meritocratic principles, 
whichever individual is most wise should be the one to rule the household. 
 I submit that Li faces the following dilemma. On the one hand, the logic of Li’s 
Confucian harmony is arguably still not sufficiently egalitarian in a family setting; it appears 
to fail to recognize the desirability of joint rule amongst adult parents, even when they have 
unequal qualifications, with one being somewhat more empathetic, experienced and educated. 
On the other hand, if Li does want to make room for joint rule amongst adults in a family, 
then he appears to be logically committed to something similarly democratic at the political 
level, taking him still farther from Confucian meritocratic ideals.   
 I see three possible ways for Li to respond to this dilemma. First, he might accept the 
first horn and indeed favour a single head of household who is most wise, pointing out that, if 
there were to be such differential power amongst adults in a family, it would be fine for a 
matriarch to have the final authority to make decisions. Second, Li might opt for democracy 
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in government, viewing egalitarian political relationships to constitute (or robustly cause) 
harmony. Third, Li might try to argue that the logic of meritocracy favours inequality in 
government, but not in the family; perhaps the variations in qualifications amongst adults to 
govern a family are not so great as to warrant differential power, whereas variations in 
qualifications amongst adults to govern a nation are that great. 
 It is clear how most contemporary African philosophers would resolve the dilemma; 
they would opt in favour of political democracy, though of course not on grounds of 
Confucian harmony. The conception of harmony or communion salient in the sub-Saharan 
tradition has a strong egalitarian bent to it, and has been frequently invoked to justify a kind 
of democracy oriented towards consensus (Gyekye 1992; Wiredu 1996: 172-190, 2000; Bujo 
1997: 157-180; Ramose 1999: 135-152; Metz 2009: esp. 344-348). In the African tradition, 
harmony includes not merely acting beneficently and enjoying a sense of togetherness, but 
also participating with other people on an even-handed basis. Recall mention of “cooperation” 
in the above characterizations of the kind of harmony or communion that African intellectuals 
characteristically prize. Central to a harmonious relationship is coordinating behaviour, 
adjusting one’s actions to make possible the realization of others’ ends, if not ends shared 
with them; subordination is out of place.  
It is well known that traditional African societies often had a king, but one who would 
routinely defer to consensus achieved amongst a group of (male) elders, who had often been 
popularly appointed. And then it was also common for decisions affecting the clan to be made 
consequent to unanimous agreement reached after discussion amongst all affected adults. 
Contemporary African political philosophers, inspired by these practices and by the value of 
harmony underlying them, have proposed fascinating forms of how to share power in a 
modern state. For instance, what if it were a Constitutional rule that, in order for a statute to 
be valid, all representatives must come to a unanimous agreement about what would be best 
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for the public as a whole, thereby preventing majoritarian blocs of lawmakers from running 
roughshod over minority interests and views (see esp. Wiredu 1996: 172-190, 2000)? 
 So, it appears that the African conception of harmony readily prescribes sharing 
power, whereas the Confucian conception does not. How to choose between them? One 
strategy from the African perspective would be to press Li and other Confucians on the type 
of harmony they deeply value, upon reflection. Recall that Li’s characterization of harmony 
includes nothing that is necessarily hierarchical, and that his central definitions of it speak of 
“coordination and cooperation” (e.g., 2014: 9). One kind of difference could be hierarchical 
role, but, by Li’s reading, such is not essential, just as it is not in the case of making a tasty 
soup with a variety of ingredients, or playing beautiful music with divergent kinds of 
instruments. Similarly, as I have discussed, Li appears to reject hierarchical roles between 
men and women in a family, and he also maintains they are inappropriate between friends, 
where friendship, Li notes (2014: 102-103), is traditionally one of the influential “Five 
Relationships” that is egalitarian. If all these relationships can exhibit Confucian harmony 
without hierarchy, can political ones, too?  
Conclusion: Harmonizing the Two Conceptions?  
In this critical notice of Li’s The Confucian Philosophy of Harmony, I have sought to spell out 
its central claims about the nature and role of harmony in Confucian philosophy, to indicate 
how they make an addition to the stock of knowledge, to consider how Li’s conception of 
harmony relates to other cardinal Confucian concepts, and to appraise it in light of another 
non-Western value system, namely, a conception of harmony salient in the sub-Saharan 
African philosophical tradition. According to Li, Confucian harmony is a process by which 
heterogeneous, even opposing, factors are integrated in such a way that brings out the best of 
them, whereas a more African conception of harmony is cooperative, altruistic action 
consequent to a shared sense of self. I have noted similarities and differences between these 
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ideals, and worked to draw out their different implications for which kinds of social 
interaction are morally desirable. 
 Although I have been sympathetic towards the African approach, I have not sought to 
argue that it is better. Instead, my primary goal has been to put Confucian harmony into 
dialogue with an ethic that is closer to it than typical Western ones, but still removed enough 
to offer a critical vantage point. In a phrase, I have sought to introduce some “creative 
tension”. From a typically sub-Saharan perspective, it is morally important to act consequent 
to identification with others, to be hospitable towards strangers who are deemed to have a 
dignity (even if at some expense to one’s family), and to resolve political conflicts by sharing 
power amongst all adults affected. Can Confucian harmony be interpreted in a way that 
accounts for some of these characteristically African values? In cases where it cannot, is it 
Confucianism or the competing values that should be adjusted or rejected? These are 
interesting questions that have emerged only recently amongst those doing philosophy in a 
globalized world. Li’s book has enabled us to pose them and perhaps, in time, to answer 
them.  
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